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Abstract
We study the simple model of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs,
offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations
are not possible. For this model, known as the house allocation model, we characterize the class
of rules satisfying unavailable object invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness,
resource-monotonicity, truncation invariance, and strategy-proofness: any rule with these prop-
erties must allocate objects based on (implicitly induced) objects’ priorities over agents and the
agent-proposing deferred-acceptance-algorithm.
JEL Classification: D63, D70
Keywords: deferred-acceptance-algorithm, indivisible objects allocation, resource-monotonicity,
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1 Introduction
We study the simple model of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs,
offices, etc.) to agents. Agents have strict preferences over objects and remaining unassigned. An
assignment is an allocation of the objects to the agents such that every agent receives at most
one object. A rule associates an assignment to each preference profile. This problem is known as
the “house allocation problem” and the search for “good” rules to solve it has been the subject of
various contributions (Ehlers, 2002; Ehlers and Klaus, 2004, 2007, 2011; Kesten, 2009; Pa´pai, 2000).
As Ehlers and Klaus (2004, 2011) and Kesten (2009) we consider situations where resources may
change, i.e., it could be that additional objects are available. When the change of the environment
is exogenous, it would be unfair if the agents who were not responsible for this change were treated
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unequally. We apply this idea of solidarity and require that if additional resources become available,
then all agents (weakly) gain. This requirement is called resource-monotonicity (Chun and Thom-
son, 1988). Ehlers and Klaus (2004, 2011) and Kesten (2009) consider resource-monotonic rules
for house allocation and prove that resource-monotonicity together with efficiency and some other
properties characterizes the class of mixed-dictator-pairwise-exchange rules. Here, we only impose
the mild efficiency requirement of weak non-wastefulness1 as well as the very basic and intuitive
properties of individual rationality2 and unavailable object invariance.3 We also impose the in-
variance property truncation invariance.4 Our last property is the well-known strategic robustness
condition of strategy-proofness.5 We show that these elementary and intuitive properties character-
ize the class of so-called deferred-acceptance-rules, i.e., any rule with these properties must allocate
objects based on (implicitly induced) objects’ priorities over agents and the outcome of the agent-
proposing deferred-acceptance-algorithm. The class of deferred-acceptance-rules contains the class
of mixed-dictator-pairwise-exchange rules as characterized by Ehlers and Klaus (2004, 2011) and
Kesten (2009); in fact, our main result implies these previous characterizations (and strengthens
one of them).
Related papers are Kojima and Manea (2010) and Ehlers and Klaus (2012). They characterize
deferred-acceptance rules based on “responsive” priorities and “acceptant substitutable” priorities
for a more general model where several identical copies of an object may be available (whereas in
our house allocation model only one copy of each object is available). Example 1 shows that our
characterization only holds for house allocation but not for the more general model considered by
Kojima and Manea (2010) and Ehlers and Klaus (2012). Note that in all these contributions prior-
ities are derived from a rule via a set of properties. Other papers take exogenous priorities as given
and impose properties on the rule using these exogenous priorities. Balinski and So¨nmez (1999)
and Morrill (2013) then characterize the deferred-acceptance rules based on “responsive” priorities
and “substitutable” priorities.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the house allocation model,
properties of rules, and the class of deferred-acceptance-rules. In Section 3 we state our charac-
terization of the class of deferred-acceptance-rules (Theorem 1) and derive (strengthen) previous
characterizations of Ehlers and Klaus (2004, 2011) and Kesten (2009) (Corollary 1). Proofs and
the independence of properties in Theorem 1 can be found in the Appendix.
1No agent who does not receive any real object (but the so-called null object) would prefer to obtain a real object
that is not assigned.
2Each agent weakly prefers his allotment to not receiving any object (or to receiving the so-called null object).
3The rule only depends on the set of available object types.
4“Truncating preferences” by moving the null object below the assigned object does not change the allocation.
5No agent can manipulate the allocation to his advantage by lying about his preferences.
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2 House Allocation
2.1 The Model and Notation
Our house allocation model is identical to that described in Ehlers and Klaus (2004, 2011).
Let N denote a finite set of agents, |N | ≥ 2. Let K denote a set of potential real objects (or
real houses). Not receiving any real object is called “receiving the null object.” Let 0 represent the
null object. Each agent i ∈ N is equipped with a preference relation Ri over all objects K ∪ {0}.
Given x, y ∈ K ∪ {0}, x Ri y means that agent i weakly prefers x to y, and x Pi y means that
agent i strictly prefers x to y. We assume that Ri is strict, i.e., Ri is a linear order over K ∪ {0}.
Let R denote the class of all linear orders over K ∪ {0}, and RN the set of (preference) profiles
R = (Ri)i∈N such that for all i ∈ N , Ri ∈ R. Given i ∈ N and Ri ∈ R, object x ∈ K is acceptable
under Ri if x Pi 0. Let A(Ri) = {x ∈ K : x Pi 0} denote the set of acceptable objects under Ri.
Given K ′ ⊆ K ∪ {0}, let Ri|K′ denote the restriction of Ri to K ′ and R|K′ = (Ri|K′)i∈N . Given
R ∈ RN and M ⊆ N , let RM denote the profile (Ri)i∈M . It is the restriction of R to the set of
agents M . We also use the notation R−M = RN\M and R−i = RN\{i}.
An allocation is a list a = (ai)i∈N such that for all i ∈ N , ai ∈ K ∪ {0} and none of the real
objects in K is assigned to more than one agent. Note that 0, the null object, can be assigned to
any number of agents and that not all real objects have to be assigned. Let A denote the set of all
allocations. Let H denote the set of all non-empty subsets H of K. A (house allocation) problem
consists of a preference profile R ∈ RN and a set of real objects H ∈ H. Note that the associated
set of available objects H ∪ {0} always includes the null object. An (allocation) rule is a function
ϕ : RN ×H → A such that for all problems (R,H) ∈ RN ×H, ϕ(R,H) ∈ A is feasible, i.e., for all
i ∈ N , ϕi(R,H) ∈ H ∪ {0}. By feasibility, each agent receives an available object. Given i ∈ N ,
we call ϕi(R,H) the allotment of agent i at ϕ(R,H).
2.2 Properties of Rules
A natural requirement for a rule is that the chosen allocation depends only on preferences over the
set of available objects.
Unavailable Object Invariance:6 For all (R,H) ∈ RN×H and all R′ ∈ RN such that R|H∪{0} =
R′|H∪{0}, ϕ(R,H) = ϕ(R′, H).
By individual rationality each agent should weakly prefer his allotment to the null object.
Individual Rationality: For all (R,H) ∈ RN ×H and all i ∈ N , ϕi(R,H)Ri 0.
Next, we introduce two properties that require a rule to not waste any resources. First, non-
wastefulness (Balinski and So¨nmez, 1999) requires that no agent prefers an available real object
that is not assigned to his allotment. Non-wastefulness is a weak efficiency requirement.
6In Ehlers and Klaus (2004, 2011) we call this property independence of irrelevant objects.
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Non-Wastefulness: For all (R,H) ∈ RN × H, all x ∈ H, and all i ∈ N , if x Pi ϕi(R,H), then
there exists j ∈ N such that ϕj(R,H) = x.
Next, we weaken non-wastefulness by requiring that no agent receives the null object while he
prefers an available real object that is not assigned.
Weak Non-Wastefulness: For all (R,H) ∈ RN ×H, all x ∈ H, and all i ∈ N , if x Pi ϕi(R,H)
and ϕi(R,H) = 0, then there exists j ∈ N such that ϕj(R,H) = x.
Weak non-wastefulness is a limited efficiency requirement that only applies to agents who receive
the null object.
Of course, no resources are wasted if a rule is (Pareto) efficient.
Efficiency: For all (R,H) ∈ RN × H, there exists no feasible allocation a ∈ A such that for all
i ∈ N , ai Ri ϕi(R,H), and for some j ∈ N , aj Pj ϕj(R,H).
Note that efficiency implies individual rationality and (weak) non-wastefulness.
When the set of objects varies, another natural requirement is resource-monotonicity. As al-
ready explained in the Introduction, this is a widely used solidarity property introduced by Chun
and Thomson (1988) and it describes the effect of a change in the available resources on the welfare
of the agents. A rule is resource-monotonic if the availability of more real objects has a (weakly)
positive effect on all agents.
Resource-Monotonicity: For all R ∈ RN and all H,H ′ ∈ H, if H ⊆ H ′, then for all i ∈ N ,
ϕi(R,H
′)Ri ϕi(R,H).
Many rules that are used in real life ignore agents’ preferences below their allotments (e.g., any
rule based on or equivalent to the famous deferred-acceptance-algorithm or the so-called priority
rules, Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, Sections 5.4.1 and 5.5.1). That is, an allocation does not change
if an agents changes his reported preferences below his allotment. We formulate a weaker version
of this invariance property by restricting agents’ changes below their allotments to truncations.
Let i ∈ N and Ri ∈ R. Then, a truncation of a preference relation Ri is a preference relation
R¯i that ranks the real objects in the same way as the corresponding original preference relation
and each real object which is acceptable under the truncation is also acceptable under the original
preference relation. Formally, preference relation R¯i ∈ R is a truncation of Ri if (a) R¯i|K = Ri|K
and (b) A(R¯i) ⊆ A(Ri). Loosely speaking, a truncation strategy of Ri is obtained by moving the
null object “up.”
If an agent truncates his preference relation in a way such that his allotment remains acceptable
under the truncated preference relation, then truncation invariance requires that the allocation is
the same under both profiles. The property is quite natural on its own in the sense that the chosen
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allocations do not depend on where any agent, who receives an individually rational real object,
ranks the null object below his allotment.
Truncation Invariance: For all (R,H) ∈ RN × H, all i ∈ N , and all R¯i ∈ Ri, if R¯i
is a truncation of Ri and ϕi(R,H) is acceptable under R¯i (i.e., ϕi(R,H) ∈ A(R¯i)), then
ϕ((R¯i, R−i), H) = ϕ(R,H).
The well-known non-manipulability property strategy-proofness requires that no agent can ever
benefit from misrepresenting his preferences.
Strategy-Proofness: For all (R,H) ∈ RN × H, all i ∈ N , and all R¯i ∈ R, ϕi(R,H) Ri
ϕi((R¯i, R−i), H).
The following strengthening of strategy-proofness requires that no group of agents can ever
benefit by misrepresenting their preferences.
Group Strategy-Proofness: For all (R,H) ∈ RN ×H, all M ⊆ N , and all R¯M ∈ RM , if for all
i ∈M , ϕi((R¯M , R−M ), H)Ri ϕi(R,H), then for all i ∈M , ϕi((R¯M , R−M ), H) = ϕi(R,H).
2.3 Priority Structures, Marriage Markets, and Stability
Given object x ∈ K, let x denote a priority ordering on N , e.g., x: 1 2 . . . n means that agent
1 has higher priority for object x than agent 2, who has higher priority for object x than agent
3, etc. Let ≡ (x)x∈K denote a priority structure. Then, given a priority structure  and a
problem (R,H), we can interpret (R, (H,)) as a marriage market (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Roth
and Sotomayor, 1990) where the set of agents N , for instance, corresponds to the set of women,
the set of objects H corresponds to the set of available men, preferences R|H∪{0} correspond to
women’s preferences over available men, and the priority structure (x)x∈H corresponds to the
available men’s preferences over women. Stability is an important requirement for many real-life
matching markets and it will turn out to be essential in our context of allocating indivisible objects
to agents as well.
Stability under : Given (R,H) ∈ RN ×H, a feasible allocation a ∈ A is stable under  if there
exists no agent-object pair (i, x) ∈ N ×H ∪ {0} such that (a) x Pi ai and (b) either [x = 0] or [for
all j ∈ N , aj 6= x] or [there exists k ∈ N such that ak = x and i x k].
Furthermore, rule ϕ is stable if there exists a priority structure  such that for each problem
(R,H) ∈ RN ×H, ϕ(R,H) is stable under .
Note that stability implies individual rationality and (weak) non wastefulness, but it does not
imply efficiency.
For any marriage market (R, (H,)), we denote by DA(R,H) the agent-optimal stable allo-
cation that is obtained by using Gale and Shapley’s (1962) agent-proposing deferred-acceptance-
algorithm: let (R, (H,)) be given. Then,
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• at the first step of the deferred-acceptance-algorithm, every agent applies to his favorite
available object in H ∪ {0}. For each available real object x ∈ H, the applicant who has the
highest priority for x is placed on the waiting list of x, and all others are rejected. The null
object 0 accepts all agents.
• At the r-th step of the deferred-acceptance-algorithm, those applicants who were rejected at
step r− 1 apply to their next best available object in H ∪ {0}. For each available real object
x ∈ H, the applicant among the new applicants and the one on the waiting list who has the
highest priority for x is placed on the (updated) waiting list of x, and all others are rejected.
The null object 0 accepts all agents.
The deferred-acceptance-algorithm terminates when every agent is on a waiting list.7 Once the
algorithm ends, available real objects are assigned to the agents on the waiting lists (all other
agents were accepted by and receive the null object) and the resulting allocation is the agent-
optimal stable allocation for the marriage problem (R, (H,)), denoted by DA(R,H).
Deferred-Acceptance-Rules: A rule ϕ is a deferred-acceptance-rule if there exists a priority
structure  such that for each (R,H) ∈ RN ×H, ϕ(R,H) = DA(R,H).
3 Characterizations of Deferred Acceptance
We first present our main characterization.
Theorem 1. Deferred-acceptance-rules are the only rules satisfying unavailable object invariance,
individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, resource-monotonicity, truncation invariance, and
strategy-proofness.
The proof of Theorem 1 in Section A.1 reveals the following additional result, which is based
on the same properties as used in Theorem 1 except for strategy-proofness.
Proposition 1. If a rule satisfies unavailable object invariance, individual rationality, weak non-
wastefulness, resource-monotonicity, and truncation invariance, then it is stable.
Next, we show how Theorem 1 implies a previous characterization result (Ehlers and
Klaus, 2011, Theorem 2) and strengthens another one (Ehlers and Klaus, 2011, Corollary 1; Kesten ,
2009, Theorem 1). To this end we introduce an acyclicity condition which can be derived by ap-
plying Ergin’s (2002) acyclicity condition to house allocation problems.
Cycles and Acyclicity: Given a priority structure  a cycle consists of distinct x, y ∈ K and
i, j, k ∈ N such that i x j x k and k y i. A priority structure  is acyclic if it has no cycles.
7Note that the null object has unlimited capacity and eventually any agent is put on the waiting list of either a
real object or accepted by the null object.
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A deferred-acceptance-rule is acyclic if the associated priority structure is acyclic.
Ergin (2002, Theorem 1) shows that the acyclicity of the priority structure  is equivalent to
efficiency or group strategy-proofness of the induced deferred-acceptance-rule DA. Furthermore,
with Kesten’s (2009, Theorem 1) result it follows that for house allocation the class of efficient
deferred-acceptance-rules equals the class of mixed-dictator-pairwise-exchange-rules characterized
in Ehlers and Klaus (2004, 2011). Then, Theorem 1 implies the following characterizations of the
subclass of acyclic deferred-acceptance-rules.
Corollary 1.
(a) Deferred-acceptance-rules with acyclic priority structures are the only rules satisfying unavail-
able object invariance, efficiency, resource-monotonicity, and truncation invariance;
(b) Deferred-acceptance-rules with acyclic priority structures are the only rules satisfying individual
rationality, weak non-wastefulness, resource-monotonicity, and group strategy-proofness.
Corollary 1(a) equals Ehlers and Klaus’s (2011) Theorem 2 (a correction of Ehlers and
Klaus, 2004, Theorem 1). Corollary 1(b) strengthens Ehlers and Klaus’s (2004) Corollary 1 and
Kesten’s (2009) Theorem 1 by replacing efficiency by the weaker properties individual rationality
and weak non-wastefulness.
The following example demonstrates that Theorem 1 and Proposition 1 do not hold for the
more general model where more than one copy of each object might be available.
Example 1. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, K = {x, y}, and there are two copies of x and one copy of y
available. We then denote a problem by (R, q), where q = (qx, qy) denotes the availability of
objects x and y, e.g., q = (2, 0) denotes that two copies of x and no copy of y are available. Let
O+(q) = {x ∈ K : qx > 0} denote the set of available real objects under q. All properties are easily
adapted to this more general allocation situation.
The following rule f satisfies unavailable object invariance, individual rationality, weak non-
wastefulness, resource-monotonicity, truncation invariance, and strategy-proofness.
Let x: 1 2 3, ′x: 1 3 2, and y: 1 2 3. Let = (x,y) and ′= (′x,y). Then, for each
problem (R, q),
f(R, q) =
{
DA′(R, q) if qx = 2 and x is agent 1’s favorite object in O+(q) and
DA(R, q) otherwise.
Note that f is not stable (and therefore, f is not a deferred-acceptance-rule): suppose that f is
stable with respect to ˆ; if qx = 2 and each agent’s favorite object is x, then agents 1 and 3 receive
x and agent 2 receives 0 (not the desired x), implying 3 ˆx2; if qx = 1, agent 2’s and agent 3’s
favorite object is x, and agent 1’s favorite object is 0, then agent 2 receives x and agent 3 receive
0 (not the desired x), implying 2 ˆx3; a contradiction.
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It is easy to see that f satisfies unavailable object invariance, individual rationality, weak non-
wastefulness, truncation invariance, and strategy-proofness.
For resource-monotonicity, let R ∈ RN and q, q′ be such that for all z ∈ K, qz ≤ q′z. It suffices
to check for possible violations of resource-monotonicity when f uses a different priority structure
for (R, q) and (R, q′). Hence, q′x = 2.
If qx = 2, then q
′
y = 1, qy = 0, x is agent 1’s favorite object in O+(q), and y is agent 1’s
favorite object in O+(q
′) (otherwise the priority structure for (R, q) and (R, q′) would not change).
Furthermore,  is used for problem (R, q) and ′ is used for problem (R, q′). Then, f1(R, q) = x
and f1(R, q
′) = y. But now two copies of object x are available for agents 2 and 3 for problem
(R, q′) and resource-monotonicity is satisfied.
Otherwise, qx < 2 and x must be agent 1’s favorite object in O+(q
′) (otherwise the priority
structure for (R, q) and (R, q′) would not change).
If qx = 0, then the only violation of resource-monotonicity could be that an agent receives y
at f(R, q) and 0 at f(R, q′). However, since object y is allocated according to the same priority
ordering under  and ′, this cannot happen.
If qx = 1, then f1(R, q) = x and none of the agents 2 or 3 can obtain x. Hence, in terms of
allocating object x is does not matter if priority ordering x or ′x is used; it is as if ′ is used for
both problems and no violation of resource-monotonicity occurs. 
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1 and Theorem 1
First, note that all deferred-acceptance rules are stable and that stability implies individual ratio-
nality and weak non-wastefulness. Furthermore, it is easy to check that all deferred-acceptance
rules satisfy unavailable object invariance and truncation invariance. Dubins and Freedman (1981)
and Roth (1982) proved strategy-proofness of all deferred-acceptance-rules. Crawford (1991) stud-
ied comparative statics of deferred-acceptance-rules. From his results it follows that all deferred-
acceptance-rules are resource-monotonic.
Second, let ϕ be a rule satisfying the properties of Theorem 1. First, we “calibrate/construct
the priority structure using maximal conflict preference profiles.”
We denote a preference relation with only one acceptable object x ∈ K by Rx, i.e., A(Rx) = {x}.
We denote the set of all preference relations that have x ∈ K as the unique acceptable object by
Rx. Let R0 ∈ R be such that A(R0) = 0.
For any S ⊆ N , let RxS = (Rxi )i∈S such that for all i ∈ S, Rxi = Rx, and similarly R0S = (R0i )i∈S
such that for all i ∈ S, R0i = R0.
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Consider the problem (RxN , {x}). By weak non-wastefulness, for some j ∈ N , ϕj(RxN , {x}) = x,
say j = 1. Then, for all i ∈ N \ {1}, we set 1 x i.
Next consider the problem ((R01, R
x−1), {x}). By weak non-wastefulness and individual rational-
ity, for some j ∈ N \ {1}, ϕj((R01, Rx−1), {x}) = x, say j = 2. Then, for all i ∈ N \ {1, 2}, we set
2 x i.
By induction, we obtain x for any object x and thus a priority structure = (x)x∈K .
Lemma 1. For all R ∈ RN and all x ∈ K, if for some j ∈ N , ϕj(R, {x}) = x, then for all
i ∈ N \ {j}, x ∈ A(Ri) implies j x i.
Proof. Let R ∈ RN and x ∈ K. Without loss of generality, suppose 1 x 2 x · · · x n. Let
S = {i ∈ N : x ∈ A(Ri)} and let j = minS. We prove Lemma 1 by showing that ϕj(R, {x}) = x.
Note that for all i ∈ N\S, 0Pix. We partition the set N\S into the “lower” set L = {1, . . . , j−1}
(possibly L = ∅) and the “upper” set U = N \ (L ∪ S) (possibly U = ∅). Note that by unavailable
object invariance, ϕ(R, {x}) = ϕ((R0L, RxS , R0U ), {x}).
By the construction of x, ϕj((R0L, RxS∪U ), {x}) = x. Hence, if U = 0, then ϕj(R, {x}) = x and
for all i ∈ N , x ∈ A(Ri) implies j x i.
Step 1 : Let k ∈ U . We prove that ϕj((R0L, RxS∪(U\{k}), R0k), {x}) = ϕj((R0L, RxS∪U ), {x}) = x.
Let y ∈ K \ {x} and R′k ∈ R be such that R′k : y x 0 . . .. By unavailable object invari-
ance, ϕj((R
0
L, R
x
S∪(U\{k}), R
′
k), {x}) = ϕj((R0L, RxS∪U ), {x}) = x. Now by resource-monotonicity,
ϕj((R
0
L, R
x
S∪(U\{k}), R
′
k), {x, y}) = x. By weak non-wastefulness and individual rationality,
ϕk((R
0
L, R
x
S∪(U\{k}), R
′
k), {x, y}) = y.
On the other hand, suppose that ϕj((R
0
L, R
x
S∪(U\{k}), R
0
k), {x}) 6= x. Then, by individual ratio-
nality, ϕk((R
0
L, R
x
S∪(U\{k}), R
0
k), {x}) 6= x. LetR′′k ∈ R be such thatR′′k : y 0 x . . . andR′′k|K = R′k|K .
By unavailable object invariance, ϕ((R0L, R
x
S∪(U\{k}), R
′′
k), {x}) = ϕ((R0L, RxS∪(U\{k}), R0k), {x}).
Thus, by weak non-wastefulness and individual rationality, for some l ∈ S ∪ (U \ {j, k}),
ϕl((R
0
L, R
x
S∪(U\{j}), R
′′
k), {x}) = x.
Now by resource-monotonicity, ϕl((R
0
L, R
x
S∪(U\{k}), R
′′
k), {x, y}) = x. By weak non-wastefulness
and individual rationality, ϕk((R
0
L, R
x
S∪(U\{k}), R
′′
k), {x, y}) = y. Now R′′k is a truncation of R′k and
both y ∈ A(R′′k) and ϕk((R0L, RxS∪(U\{k}), R′k), {x, y}) = y. Since ϕj((R0L, RxS∪(U\{k}), R′′k), {x, y}) 6=
ϕj((R
0
L, R
x
S∪(U\{k}), R
′
k), {x, y}) (because j 6= l), this is a contradiction to truncation invariance.
Hence, ϕj((R
0
L, R
x
S∪(U\{k}), R
0
k), {x}) = x.
Steps 2, . . . : Let U = {k1, . . . , kl}. Then using the same arguments as above, it follows that x =
ϕj((R
0
L, R
x
S∪U ), {x}) = ϕj((R0L, RxS∪(U\{k1}), R0k1), {x}) = ϕj((R0L, RxS∪(U\{k1,k2}), R0{k1,k2}), {x}) =
. . . = ϕj((R
0
L, R
x
S∪{kl}, R
0
U\{kl}), {x}) = ϕj((R0L, RxS , R0U ), {x}) = ϕj(R, {x}). Hence, we obtain the
desired result that ϕj(R, {x}) = x.
With the following lemma (note that so far we have not used strategy-proofness), Proposition 1
follows.
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Lemma 2. For all (R,H) ∈ RN ×H, ϕ(R,H) is stable under .
Proof. Let (R,H) ∈ RN × H. Assume that ϕ(R,H) is not stable under . Then, there exists
an agent-object pair (i, x) ∈ N × (H ∪ {0}) such that (a) x Pi ϕi(R,H) and (b) either [x = 0] or
[for all j ∈ N , ϕj(R,H) 6= x] or [there exists k ∈ N such that ϕk(R,H) = x and i x k]. By
individual rationality, x 6= 0. Hence, [for all j ∈ N , ϕj(R,H) 6= x] or [there exists k ∈ N such that
ϕk(R,H) = x and i x k].
Let R¯ ∈ RN be such that (i) for all j ∈ N such that ϕj(R,H) 6= 0, R¯j is a truncation of Rj
such that there exists no y ∈ K \ {ϕj(R,H)} with ϕj(R,H) R¯j y R¯j 0 and (ii) for all j ∈ N such
that ϕj(R,H) = 0, R¯j = Rj . (By individual rationality, R¯j in (i) is well-defined as truncation of
Rj .) By truncation invariance, ϕ(R¯,H) = ϕ(R,H) and (i, x) ∈ N ×H is such that x P¯i ϕi(R¯,H)
and [for all j ∈ N , ϕj(R¯,H) 6= x] or [there exists k ∈ N such that ϕk(R¯,H) = x and i x k].
Let S = {j ∈ N : x P¯j ϕj(R¯,H)}. Note that i ∈ S.
If for j ∈ S, ϕj(R¯, {x}) = x, then by resource-monotonicity, ϕj(R¯,H) R¯j x, contradicting
x P¯j ϕj(R¯,H). Hence, for all j ∈ S, ϕj(R¯, {x}) = 0. If S = {j ∈ N : x P¯j 0}, then this contradicts
weak non-wastefulness. Thus, S ( {j ∈ N : x P¯j 0}.
By construction of R¯, for all j ∈ N we have either (i) x P¯j ϕj(R¯,H) (and j ∈ S) or (ii)
ϕj(R¯,H) = x or (iii) 0 P¯j x. Thus, there exists k ∈ N\S such that S ∪ {k} = {j ∈ N : x P¯j 0} and
ϕk(R¯,H) = x. But then for (R¯,H) we have neither [x = 0] nor [for all j ∈ N , ϕj(R¯,H) 6= x] and
it holds ϕk(R¯,H) = x and i x k.
Hence, by the fact that for all j ∈ S, ϕj(R¯, {x}) = 0, weak non-wastefulness and resource-
monotonicity, it follows that ϕk(R¯, {x}) = x. By Lemma 1, k x i. However, at the same time
i x k; a contradiction.
So far we have established that for any rule ϕ that satisfies the properties of Theorem 1, there
exists a priority ordering  such that for any (R,H) ∈ RN ×H, ϕ(R,H) is stable under . Hence,
in the terminology of two-sided matching, the rule ϕ picks a stable matching for the marriage
market where objects have preferences over agents who consume the objects based on the priority
structure  and agents have strict preferences over objects based on preferences R (see Roth and
Sotomayor, 1990, Chapter 5). For these markets it is well-known that the deferred-acceptance-
rule is the only strategy-proof stable matching rule. Hence, Theorem 1 follows immediately from
Proposition 1.
A.2 Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. Deferred-acceptance rules (in particular those with acyclic priority structures) satisfy all the
properties listed in the corollary.
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(a) Let ϕ be a rule satisfying unavailable object invariance, efficiency, resource-monotonicity, and
truncation invariance. Since efficiency implies individual rationality and weak non-wastefulness, by
Proposition 1, there exists a priority structure  such that ϕ is stable under . Since the deferred-
acceptance-rule Pareto dominates any other stable rule (Balinski and So¨nmez, 1999, Theorem 2),
efficiency implies that ϕ = DA. Finally, by efficiency and Ergin (2002, Theorem 1),  must be
acyclic.
(b) Let ϕ be a rule satisfying individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, resource-monotonicity,
and group strategy-proofness. By Ehlers and Klaus (2004, Lemma 1), group strategy-proofness
implies unavailable object invariance. Furthermore, group strategy-proofness implies truncation
invariance and strategy-proofness. Hence, by Theorem 1, there exists a priority structure  such
that ϕ = DA. Finally, by group strategy-proofness and Ergin (2002, Theorem 1),  must be
acyclic.
A.3 Independence of Properties in Theorem 1
For any strict order pi of agents in N , we denote the corresponding serial dictatorship rule by fpi;
for example, if pi : 1 2 . . . (n−1) n, then fpi works as follows: for each problem (R,H), first agent 1
chooses his preferred object in H, then agent 2 chooses his preferred object from the remaining
objects H \ {fpi1 (R,H)}, etc. Note that for each strict order pi of N , fpi = DA
pi
where pi equals
the priority order such that for all x ∈ K, pix= pi. Thus, each serial dictatorship rule fpi satisfies
unavailable object invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, resource-monotonicity,
truncation invariance, and strategy-proofness.
The following examples establish the independence of the properties (properties not mentioned
in the examples follow easily) in Theorem 1.
Not unavailable object invariant: Let n ≥ 3 and pi : 1 2 3 . . . (n − 1) n and pi′ : 1 n (n −
1) . . . 3 2. Then, for each problem (R,H) ∈ RN ×H,
ϕ(R,H) =
{
fpi(R,H) if A(R1) = ∅ and
fpi
′
(R,H) otherwise.
Not individually rational: Let pi : 1 2 . . . (n − 1) n. For each Rn ∈ R, let Rˆn be such that
A(Rˆn) = K and Rˆn|K = Rn|K. Then, for each problem (R,H) ∈ RN ×H,
ϕ(R,H) = fpi((R−n, Rˆn), H).
Not weakly non-wasteful: Fix an object y ∈ K and pi : 1 2 . . . (n − 1) n. Then, for each
problem (R,H) ∈ RN ×H,
ϕ(R,H) = fpi(R,H \ {y}).
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Not resource-monotonic: Let pi and pi′ be two distinct strict orders of agents in N . Then, for
each problem (R,H) ∈ RN ×H,
ϕ(R,H) =
{
fpi(R,H) if H = K and
fpi
′
(R,H) otherwise.
Not strategy-proof : Let  be a priority structure. Then, the deferred-acceptance-rule based on
the object-optimal allocation that is obtained by using Gale and Shapley’s (1962) object-proposing
deferred-acceptance-algorithm satisfies all properties except strategy-proofness.8
Not truncation invariant: Let N = {1, 2, 3}, K = {x, y}, x: 3 1 2, ′x: 3 2 1, and y: 3 1 2.
Let = (x,y) and ′= (′x,y). Then, for each problem (R,H) ∈ RN ×H,
ϕ(R,H) =
{
DA(R,H) if 0 P3 x and x ∈ H and
DA′(R,H) otherwise.
Let R1 : x 0 y, R2 : x 0 y, R3 : y 0 x, and R
′
3 : y x 0. Let R = (R1, R2, R3) and R
′ =
(R1, R2, R
′
3). Note that R3 is a truncation of R
′
3 and ϕ3(R, {x, y}) = y = ϕ3(R′, {x, y}). However,
ϕ1(R, {x, y}) = x and ϕ2(R′, {x, y}) = x; a contradiction of truncation invariance. Next, we show
strategy-proofness and resource-monotonicity for this rule.
For strategy-proofness, note that agents 1 and 2 cannot change the priority structure by re-
porting a false preference relation. Agent 3 always receives his most preferred object in H for
any problem (R,H). Thus, agent 3 cannot profitably manipulate by reporting a false preference
relation.
For resource-monotonicity, let |H| = 1 and R ∈ RN . If there is a violation of resource-
monotonicity, then ϕ must use different priority structures for (R,H) and (R, {x, y}). But then we
must have H = {y} and both ϕ(R, y) = DA′(R, y) and ϕ(R, {x, y}) = DA(R, {x, y}).
If yP30, then ϕ3(R, y) = y and ϕ1(R, y) = ϕ2(R, y) = 0, and all agents weakly prefer ϕ(R, {x, y})
to ϕ(R, y).
If 0 P3 y, then ϕ3(R, y) = 0. Since ϕ(R, {x, y}) = DA(R, {x, y}), we have 0 P3 x and by
individual rationality, ϕ3(R, {x, y}) = 0. Note that 1 x 2, 1 y 2, and 1 ′y 2 (the latter
because y=′y). Let pi : 1 2 3. Then, ϕ(R, y) = DA
′
(R, y) = fpi(R, y) and ϕ(R, {x, y}) =
DA(R, {x, y}) = fpi(R, {x, y}). Hence, resource-monotonicity is satisfied.
8Given , there exist many “artificial” stable rules satisfying all properties except strategy-proofness. For instance,
let v ∈ {1, . . . , |K| − 1}. For all (R,H) ∈ RN × H, let the rule φ choose the object-optimal stable allocation (for
) if |H| ≤ v and the agent-optimal stable allocation (for ) if |H| > v. The rule φ satisfies all properties except
strategy-proofness.
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